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Abstract: While papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that
psychological considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual
decision-making, there is little explicit empirical evidence of reciprocal altruism in economic
environments.  This paper tests whether attribution of volition in choosing a wage has a
significant effect on subsequent costly effort provision.  An experiment was conducted in which
subjects are first randomly divided into groups of employers and employees.  Wages were
selected and employees asked to choose an effort level, where increased effort is costly to the
employee, but highly beneficial to the employer.  The wage-determination process was common
knowledge and wages were chosen either by the employer or by an external process.  There is
evidence for both distributional concerns and reciprocal altruism.  The slope of the effort/wage
profile is clearly positive in all cases, but is significantly higher when wages are chosen by the
employer, offering  support for the hypothesis of reciprocity.  There are implications for models
of utility and a critique of some current models is presented.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Standard economic models presume that people maximize their own financial interest,
without regard for social norms and issues such as fairness and reciprocity.  This assumption is
parsimonious and facilitates analysis; however, while it is generally quite useful and often
innocuous, it leads to unrealistic predictions of behavior in some economic situations.  While it
is difficult to isolate the influence of social preferences in the field, a large number of laboratory
experiments, such as the ultimatum game, the dictator game, and public good provision, have
demonstrated that often one cannot adequately explain individual choice behavior on the basis of
pecuniary maximization alone.  Although these experiments demonstrate that social forces can
have substantial effects on the economic decisions made by individuals, the underlying
composition and determinants of these social forces are often left unconsidered.
This paper describes the results of an experiment designed to test whether causal
attribution influences the level of material payoffs an individual is willing to sacrifice to benefit
another person.  We find that the source of the wage has a substantial effect on an employee's
level of costly effort provision.  While we observe increased effort with higher wages in all
cases, the effort/wage gradient is significantly steeper when the wage is determined by the firm.
Employer volition in wage-setting is a factor in a worker's choice of effort and subsequent
productivity.  One implication could be that wage increases which are perceived to be a “gift”
rather than a requirement will have a greater effect on marginal productivity and that perceived
employer meanness guarantees a poor employee response.
Causal attribution refers to beliefs about the determinants of an outcome. One key aspect
of attribution is whether a result has been decided through the volition of a party whose material
payoffs are affected by the choice. The psychology literature strongly suggests that people often
consider context and interpersonal history when determining their actions in social exchange
situations.  Heider (1958) introduced the idea that causal inference, where a person takes into
account another actor’s motives and situational constraints, is an important cognitive process
for perceiving social contexts.  Individuals have a need to infer causes and to attempt to assign2
responsibility for outcomes.  When volition is absent, feelings of revenge and gratitude dissipate
or vanish.1  More recently, models of social utility theory indicate that these feelings are quite
sensitive to normative expectations about “appropriate” behavior.  An abundance of psychology
experiments supports these views - for example, Greenberg and Frisch (1972) find that help
which is deliberately given leads to more reciprocity than does accidental help.2  Blount (1995)
examines negative reciprocity in a socio-economic environment, finding that the minimum
acceptable offer in an ultimatum game is significantly higher when the offer was believed to have
been generated either randomly or by a third party than when it is believed to have been chosen
by a self-interested party.3
There has been a growing focus on psychological concerns as an explanation for
deviations from pure material self-interest.  Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990)
[“A&Y”] present formal models which demonstrate how issues of social custom and fairness
can affect wages.  Rabin (1993) models reciprocal altruism, the notion that people take into
consideration the actions and intentions of others when determining their own actions, and
provides a game-theoretic explanation for the non-minimal effort levels and wages predicted by
the A&Y gift-exchange model.  His model assumes, however, that a player is neutrally disposed
toward another player if the other player has no choice of actions.  If an employer has not
chosen the wage, we should expect minimum effort regardless of the wage,  since an employee
should be unwilling to sacrifice any material payoff to benefit a non-volitional employer.  In
addition, the Rabin model does not apply formally to extensive-form games; however,
extensions to sequential games can be made (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998).
                                           
1 “Feelings of both revenge and gratitude become markedly attenuated ... upon the discovery that the
harm or the benefit [to the individual] was not the true goal of the agent.  ... Gratitude is determined
by the will, the intention, of the benefactor.  Attribution to source and intention has similar
significance in the case of revenge.”  (Heider, 1958, p. 265)
2 See also Thibaut and Riecken (1955), Goranson and Berkowitz (1966), Kelley and Stahelski
(1970), Kelley (1972), and Kahn and Tice (1973).
3Blount also tests for significance between minimum acceptable offers in the random and third-party
conditions, but has mixed results.  In both Study 1 and Study 2, minimum acceptable offers are lower
with perceived random-generation; however, this difference is only statistically significant in Study 2.3
While these papers argue convincingly that fairness is important in economic
environments, there is little direct evidence for reciprocal altruism in such a context. Fehr,
Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1993) and Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold, and Gächter (1998) perform
“gift-exchange” experiments and find that social forces play a major role in this context.  A self-
interested worker should provide the minimum possible effort, yet effort levels at higher wages
tended to be much higher, rewarding firms for setting high wages. These results contradict the
standard money-maximizing theory.  Yet it is not clear whether employees are simply choosing
to share their greater wealth with the firm, or whether workers are truly acting reciprocally.
Does the slope of the wage/effort profile depend on the causal attribution for the wage-
determination process?
  The experiment presented in this paper adapts the Blount (1995) and Fehr et al (1998)
experiments, using a simulated labor market and separate treatments in which wages are
determined by either the employer or by an external process.  Blount does not examine
generosity in an economic environment, whereas Fehr et al do not test for the source of the
apparent worker generosity.  If intentions are irrelevant, we should expect the effort/wage slope
to be the same, regardless of the causal attribution.   On the other hand, if a firm's volition
matters, this slope should be significantly higher when the wage is chosen by the employer. We
find a voluntary higher wage leads to greater effort and productivity than does an externally-
imposed higher wage, while an intentionally low wage guarantees minimal effort.
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A total of 122 subjects participated in this experiment; 61 had the role of "employee"
and the other 61 had the "employer" designation.  Average earnings, including a $5 show-up
fee, were between $16 and $17 for about 100 minutes of time.  All subjects were students at UC
- Berkeley.  A full description of the instructions and record sheets issued to the subjects is in
Appendix A.  There were, in general, ten employers and ten employees in an experiment which
consisted of ten periods.  Employers and employees initially all met in one large room; after a4
brief introduction and a random assignment of roles, the employers were moved to another
room.  Having all participants meet in one room at the outset made it more credible that another
real person's payoffs were dependent on the employee's action choice. Pairings were anonymous
and it was common knowledge that workers and firms were matched only once, so that
reputation-formation should not be a concern.4
An employee was given a wage, which she knew had been assigned by either an
employer or an external process. This external process was either a draw from a bingo cage or
an assignment made by the experimenter.5  Balls were drawn individually, in front of successive
subjects.  In the third-party condition, subjects were informed that wages had been pre-selected
by the experimenter for each employee in each period.6  Each employee was in only one of the
treatments and each session was a different treatment.  Once assigned a wage, each employee
was asked to record an effort choice (between 0.1 and 1.0, inclusive) on a record sheet and to
fold this sheet before turning it in to the experimenter.  This sheet was then given to her
employer in the other room, so that the employer had salient physical evidence of the employee's
choice.  Unlike the Fehr et al (1998), employees could not reject the wage;7 thus, an employer
could guarantee herself a monetary payoff of at least 10 guilders in each round by choosing a
wage of 20.8  Absent strategic, repeated-game considerations, a high wage can be seen as either
a "gift" or an attempt to elicit positive reciprocity.
                                           
4There were sessions with less than 10 pairs, so that there were occasional anonymous re-pairings.
However, this issue didn't appear very salient and, as will be seen, the data does not show any
indication of reputation-building, which might occur if a subject expected his choice to be a factor in
a re-pairing.
5 In the 1st case, wages assigned in the employer-determined case were mapped onto the numbers of
the balls in the bingo cage, with wages increasing with ball numbers.
6 As shall be seen, the slope-coefficients for the two exogenous conditions are nearly identical (.0089
and .0086, in the fixed-effect Tobit regressions) and the data are pooled.  A likelihood-ratio test of
the restricted model (see section 4) gives c
2 = .214, n.s.
7 I thank Ernst Fehr for this suggestion, which allows a cleaner comparison across treatments.
8Experimental "guilders" were converted to dollars at the rate of 25 to $1.5
The combination of wage and effort determined outcomes and monetary payoffs for
each pair of subjects in a period.  Each employer was given an endowment of 120 "income
coupons" in each period.  The monetary payoff functions were given by:
PF = (120 - w) * e                                   (1)
PE = w - c(e) - 20                                    (2)
where F represents the employer, E the employee, e denotes the employee's effort, w is the
wage, and c(e) is the cost of effort, a function increasing in e.9  Wages were constrained to be
between 20 and 120, inclusive.  The payoff functions were common knowledge and participants
were required to calculate both employer and employee payoffs in three exercises with
hypothetical wage-effort pairs.  These exercises (see Appendix A) were reviewed before
proceeding with the experiment, insuring that subjects understood the payoff mechanism and
that higher effort meant higher employer earnings, but lower employee earnings.  The only
difference across the attribution treatments was the wage-generating mechanism.  In all cases,
for the purposes of calculating income, the wage was subtracted from the employer endowment
of 120.  At the conclusion of a session, all participants were paid privately.
The experimental design helps shed light on some theoretical models. The Akerlof
(1982) gift-exchange model characterizes the offer of employment as an offer to "exchange
gifts" and the worker's effort level indicates the size of the reciprocal gift.  A natural
interpretation of this model is that an exogenous wage would not be considered a gift, so that
effort choice should be dependent on causal attribution and the slope of the effort/wage profile
should differ across treatments.  Bolton (1991) presents a bargaining model to explain behavior
in a sequential version of the ultimatum game, concluding that relative payoffs play an important
role in a subject's utility.  Relative payoffs are indeed found to be important in this experiment,
                                           
9Note that the cost of minimum effort (.1) is 0.  This functional form was used in Fehr et al (1998)
and was replicated here to allow comparisons.  While it is not the usual profit/wage/effort
relationship, it does ensure that profits are non-negative.  This multiplicative set-up allows an
employee to greatly increase an employer's earnings, at a fairly low cost to the employee. The
functional form has the feature that more productivity (effort) generally leads to greater joint income,
so that higher levels of effort are encouraged from the standpoint of total welfare.6
but this model offers no role for intentionality and predicts minimal effort in all cases. The Rabin
model allows for both positive and negative reciprocity, including psychological payoffs in the
utility function.10  This notion suggests that different causal attributions will lead to different
rates of marginal transformation between pecuniary and psychological payoffs, implying a
difference in the effort/wage profile.  A newer generation of models includes Bolton and
Ockenfels (1997) and Fehr and Schmidt (1997).  These models account for distributive effects,
but offer no role for intentional reciprocity.
If psychological considerations are important, we should expect to see deviations from
"rational self-interest."  If we represent the wage-effort relation by:
e = a + b*w            (3)
The Fehr et al (1998) experiment finds that b > 0.11  It was expected that this result would be
replicated here.  In addition, my specific hypothesis is:
The slope of the wage-effort relationship will be significantly higher when wages are
determined by employers than when wages are determined exogenously.
If we represent the wage-effort relation by:
e1 = a1 + b1*w1 (4)
e2 = a2 + b2*w2 (5)
                                           
10 I use a later formulation, which is: Ui(ai,aj,ri) = Pi(ai,aj) + ri*fi(ai,aj).  The original 1993 paper
uses 1+fj(ai,aj), rather than ri.  Here Ui is the utility function for player i, Pi is the monetary payoff
to player i, fi(ai,aj) is the kindness function, which measures how "kind" player i is being to player j
by choosing strategy ai, and ri is player i's disposition towards player j. Both fi and ri can be either
positive or negative.  One's disposition toward another player influences the choice of fi; if player i is
positively (negatively) disposed to player j, she will increase her utility by choosing a positive
(negative) fi.  Player i's disposition toward player j is the result of j's choice and i's perception of  j's
motivation for this choice.
11 Given that PF = (120-w)*e and PE = w-c(e)-20, note that  b should be less than 0 for pure
altruists. Since a higher level of effort yields greater benefits for the employer when the wage is low,
as the effort level would then multiply a larger number of employer income coupons, this effectively
allows the altruist to trade-off welfare at a more favorable ratio.7
where the subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the exogenous and employer cases, respectively, this
hypothesis states that b2>b1.  The residual (b2 - b1) can be attributed to reciprocal altruism.  Note
that a1 and a2 cannot be assumed to be the same and in fact differ substantially.
3. RESULTS
The results from all treatments indicate that b > 0, at very high levels of significance.12
Only 13 of the 61 employees acted in accordance with the predictions for rational money-
maximizers by always selecting the minimum effort regardless of the wage offered.  The
remaining 79% of the subject population demonstrated a contingent willingness to consider an
employer's welfare and choose higher effort with a higher wage.
Table 1 presents a summary of the data.  Detailed results are presented in Appendix B.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the distribution of the wage/effort pairs.
Table 1: Results by wage bracket
Wage range      Average effort
                  Employer      Random    Third party
           N      N       N
20-59 .1827 104 .2431   72 .2108    74
60+ .4293 116 .4093  118 .3873   126
Total .3127 220 .3463  190 .3220   200
Figure 1
                                           
12 Full results for all regressions are available from the author upon request.8















Wage/effort pairs for employer-generated wages
Figure 2














Wage/effort pairs for exogenous wages
As effort was bounded on both sides (259 of 610 observations had extreme effort values), a
two-sided Tobit regression was used to account for the censoring problem.  The effort/wage
slope is very similar for the third-party and random treatments and these data have been pooled9
as exogenous wages.  A likelihood ratio test on the restriction of identical slopes shows that we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the slopes are the same (LR test  = 2[(-696.611) - (-696.718)]
￿ c
2 = .214, n.s.). Table 1 shows the values for a and b in the two treatments:
Table 1
Treatment N a b t(b) p-value
Employer 220      -.0941       .00951        10.93 .0000
Exogenous 390       .0123       .00738         10.41 .0000
Note that the value for a is the intercept at w=20 and recall that the range of effort was from
0.1 to 1.0, so that these lower values indicate that less effort would have been provided at w =
20 if this had been possible.  The difference between a1 and a2 is substantial and shows that
there is considerable negative reciprocity for intentional low wages.  This is highlighted by an
examination of the effort choices in response to low wages: In the 50 occasions where an
employer chose a wage less than 40, an employee chose costly effort only twice.  This compares
with 17 of 66 choices of costly effort in this wage range in the exogenous cases (c
2 = 9.8, p <
.01).
While there were the 610 wage-effort pairs obtained in the experiment, this was
comprised of 10 observations for each of 61 subjects.  A fixed-effects model specifies individual
intercepts within each set of 10 periods.  This regression model is:
e = a1d1 + a2d2 + ... +  a61d61 + bw + Dtw (6)
Here di is a dummy representing employee i and D is a dummy which takes on a value of 1 in
the exogenous case and is 0 otherwise.  This fixed-effect regression gives the result that:
EFFORT = (Individual dummies) + .00900*WAGE + .00211*DUMMY*WAGE
   (15.7)        (2.49)
610 observations Log-likelihood = -696.71810
The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics.  If the effort/wage profile is steeper when there
is employer volition, the coefficient for t  should be significantly positive; we see that this is
confirmed at p < 01. This confirms the hypothesis that reciprocal altruism is a significant
influence on workers’ choice of effort, apparently generating about 20% of the magnitude of the
positive effort/wage slope.  Separate fixed-effect Tobit regressions for the random and third-
party treatments give similar slope coefficients of .0089 and .0086, respectively,
For an estimation of the relative importance of distributive and reciprocal forces, it may
be more informative to only include observations where non-minimal effort was provided, since
minimal effort choices do not shed light on this issue. The regression on only these observations
shows a substantially larger relative effect for intentional sequential reciprocity:
EFFORT = (Individual dummies) + .00712*WAGE + .00430*DUMMY*WAGE
   (14.1)        (4.30)
363 observations Log-likelihood = -551.708
The coefficient for t is significantly positive, with p < .001.  This regression suggests that 38%
of the observed positive slope can be attributed to reciprocity.
In both of these regressions, there is a concern that the effort choices may be serially
correlated and therefore not independent.  One test for serial correlation in a fixed effects model
is to test whether a lagged independent variable significantly affects the dependent variable
(Heckman, 1981).  Here we can test if the previous period’s wage influences the effort choice.
The two-sided Tobit fixed-effects regression on all  549 observations for periods 2-10:
EFFORT = (Individual dummies) + .01024*WAGE + .00034*LAGWAGE
      (21.7)        (0.73)
549 observations Log-likelihood = -608.750
The coefficient for the lagged wage is not significant.  Running this test on only the
corresponding observations for employer-generated wages, we have:
EFFORT = (Individual dummies) + .01273*WAGE - .00005*LAGWAGE
      (12.0)       (-0.07)11
198 observations Log-likelihood = -215.746
It appears that there is little or no evidence of serial correlation with respect to effort provision.
Some may still not be satisfied with this fixed-effects model.  As an alternative, we can
perform a nonparametric test on individual employees’ behavior across treatments.  Here this
approach treats each individual’s actions as one data point.  Each employee’s effort/wage slope
is estimated for his or her ten observations, using a two-sided Tobit regression.  A Wilcoxon
rank-order test (see Siegel and Castellan, 1988) on these estimated slopes finds a difference
significant at p = .05. (Wx = 574 for the 22 employees in the intentionality condition ￿ z =
1.622).  Thus, even the possibly less efficient nonparametric test, which discards size and only
retains order, confirms statistical significance for the difference in slopes across treatments.
There was a surprising phenomenon with random wage-determination.  Here, when the
wage was 20, subjects voluntarily chose a negative payoff in 5 cases of 22 (23%), opting to
greatly enhance a blameless employer's payoffs at a small personal cost.13  Such behavior is in
conflict with the influence of loss-aversion and, along with the intentionality effect, is not
predicted by existing models of comparative payoffs. While Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) and
Fehr and Schmidt (1997) can explain the positive effort/wage slope, these models expect a
person to never be generous when all choices result in lower comparative payoffs.14
Finally, it is interesting to check whether employers learn to offer their payoff-
maximizing optimal wage.  While the data is not conclusive at conventional standard levels of
statistical significance, there does appear to be movement in this direction; perhaps 10 periods is
insufficient for adequate learning.  Appendix D shows the relationship over time.
                                           
13 Note that, in the third-party treatent, voluntary negative earnings occurred only in 1 of 15 cases
when the wage was 20 (and never occurred when the employer set the wage at 20).  Apparently, this
charitable impulse is muted if it is possible to consider a person  responsible for the wage
determination.
14 Given these payoff parameters, this was only possible when the wage was less than 30.12
Discussion
A potentially serious concern is whether the results might be caused by repeated game
effects.  For example, one explanation for costly effort provision is that employees are
attempting to develop a reputation, either for themselves or for the group of employees as a
whole.  Even though the structure of the experiment would seem to rule out individual
reputations, it could still be the case that a subject would attempt to develop one. We can check
this by testing for changes in subjects' choices over time, as reputation effects should diminish
sharply near the end of a session.  Graphs of effort measures over time are presented in
Appendix C.  Two tests of period effects using OLS regressions give the following results:
Employer-generated wages
EFFORT = .3015 + .001381*PERIOD  RATIO =  .00620 - .0000380*PERIOD
     (0.473)       (-0.686)
Exogenous wages
EFFORT = .3338 + .000094*PERIOD  RATIO =  .00635 - .0000342*PERIOD
     (0.040)       (-0.567)
Effort increases very slightly with time in both treatments, at a statistically insignificant rate. A
better test is to look at the ratio of non-minimal effort to non-minimal wage, where RATIO =
(EFFORT - .1)/(WAGE - 20).  Here we see that there is a very slight decline in the ratio over
time in both treatments.  In no case are the slope t-statistics close to significance and it is clear
that the difference across treatments is not significant.  While one cannot be certain that no
subject was trying to establish a reputation (even with a bingo cage), the lack of a substantial
time trend and the comparison across regressions provides no evidence for reputation effects.
Although the values of b may appear small,15 they lead to dramatic differences in effort
level and consequent employer profits over the wage range.  In the employer case, the expected
value for effort given a wage of 45 is .13.  In contrast, with an assigned wage of 75, the
expected effort is .42.  When an employer assigns a wage of 75, her expected earnings of 19
                                           
15 By comparison, in Fehr et al (1998), values for b ranged from .0035 to .0087, depending on the
regression and treatment.  Given that employees could not reject wages in my experiment, one should
expect b to be higher here.13
guilders (calculated using the fitted values for a and b from Table 1) are nearly double her
expected earnings of 10 guilders when she chooses a wage of 20.  The results from the
employer treatment indicate that employer profits were in fact highest when the wage was 70,
while the fitted values tell us that the profit-maximizing wage should be 74.9. The money-
maximizing model would recommend selecting the minimum wage of 20.   
The proportion of the effort/wage gradient that is a direct consequence of reciprocity is
estimated at 20-35%.  This may seem unrealistically low to some; however, this calibration must
be viewed with caution, since the relative size of the components of the positive effort/wage
slope is likely to be sensitive to the functional form of the monetary payoffs.  In addition, the
effort choice reflects the credibility of the causal attribution.  One might expect this effect to be
stronger in the field, where actions in a real labor market are perhaps more salient and credible
than in an artificial laboratory environment.16
The positive effort/wage slope in all cases might be expected by some and is seen in the
volitional case in Fehr et al (1993) and Fehr et al (1998).  However,  it is not the prediction that
would be made by a number of economic models, even some that acknowledge the influence of
fairness.  The money-maximizing model would predict a complete lack of costly effort
provision.  The Bolton (1991) model captures the importance of comparative payoffs, but does
not explain non-minimal effort at high wages, as one should never wish to decrease one’s
relative share.  Assumption 4 of this model states (p. 1110)  that "if a bargainer receives a share
larger than or equal to the share received by his partner, the only way to make him better off is
to increase his money holdings."  An employee who receives a wage of at least 30 can guarantee
a payoff greater than that of the employer by choosing minimum effort and so can be considered
to be “endowed” with a default higher monetary payoff.  Thus, even an employee given a very
generous wage by an employer could not increase his utility by exerting any costly effort.  The
Rabin (1993) model predicts the volitional effects, but since the psychological payoffs (and the
                                           
16 There is evidence that reciprocity is a learned phenomenon and that it is stronger in a
homogeneous population.  The considerable heterogeneity and the relative lack of work experience of
the subject pool might indicate the proportion found here is a lower bound.14
utility incentive to sacrifice monetary payoffs) are induced only when player have a choice of
actions, it predicts minimum effort and a slope of 0 with exogenous wages.   There is no
doubt that comparative payoffs are important, but it would appear that reciprocal altruism plays
a key role as well.  The Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) and Fehr and Schmidt (1997) focus on
distributive effects.  In principle, these models can readily account for most of the data.
However, both models rule out a role for intentionality, although Fehr and Schmidt (p. 30)
admit this may not be realistic.  The significant difference in slopes found here cannot be
explained by either approach.  In addition, the poor do sometimes give to the rich, in
contradistinction to the Fehr and Schmidt assertion.17 We may observe altruism (at favorable
transformation rates) even when comparative payoffs rule it out.  Charness (1998) is an attempt
to generalize these distributive models to include reciprocal altruism.
In any event, the results indicate that an individual is, in many situations, willing to
contribute a portion of her monetary payoff in order to increase another's payoffs.  The
willingness to do so at any specified exchange rate depends on the payoffs which would be the
consequence of one's choice.  When the employer does not determine the wage, this cannot be
viewed as reciprocal altruism, but instead reflects distributive concerns.
While it is difficult to accurately assess the economic significance of the prediction errors
of the more recent preference theories, the impact seems greatest at the extremes of the wage
distribution.  At the high end, the comparative payoff models underestimate the likely
productivity with intentional high wages.18  Productivity could be 10-20% higher if a high wage
is perceived to be a voluntary gift.  On the low end, it may seem that, regardless of the wage-
generation method, there is generally minimum effort with low wages.  However, in a natural
setting, a worker may be able to exert “negative effort” if resentful, in the sense of sabotage or
                                           
17 For example, a poor person might hold an elevator door for a rich person hurrying to catch the
elevator or a poor person might rescue a rich person’s baby from danger.
18 The nature of the payoff function in the traditional gift-exchange experiment hinders the
effectiveness of high effort, as the effective transformation rate from increased effort into higher
employer payoffs declines substantially in the upper wage ranges.  For example, at a wage of 60, a
marginal unit of effort is worth 6 to the employer, while at a wage of 100, it is only worth 2.  With a
wage of 120, nothing can help the employer financially.15
unobserved shirking.  Given that monitoring is expensive and imperfect, it can be costly for a
firm to be considered to be taking advantage of its employees.  The economic consequences of
resentment and sabotage could be substantial.
4. CONCLUSION
There is  little doubt that pecuniary concerns are the most important factor in most
economic choices made.  However, as is suggested by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986)
and A&Y, fairness considerations cannot be ignored in socio-economic environments.  In this
experiment, we see costly effort provision, the extent of which depends on both the wage and
the mechanism for its determination.  Distributive concerns have a large role here, but the
hypothesis of reciprocity is also well-supported by the results.  The slope of the effort/wage
profile in the self-interested volitional case is substantially larger than the slope when wages are
exogenous - an employer receives greater rewards for high wages and more "punishment" for
low wages when the employer chooses the wage. The difference in the effort/wage slope reflects
both positive and negative reciprocity: we see that when wages are employer-determined,
employees provide more effort at high wages and consistently minimal effort at low wages. This
result ties in with experiments in the psychology literature.
If we believe that reciprocal altruism is an important factor, there are some potential
policy implications.  One prediction is that workers will not respond as well to a higher wage if
it is imposed by an external agency or is perceived to have been extracted from the employer by
union pressure as they would if this same wage is voluntarily employer-generated.  We also see
that considerations of fairness act as constraints on profit-seeking.  An employer who selects the
minimum wage has, on average, much lower income than one who chooses a wage of 70. The
results also suggest that it is beneficial for a firm to credibly signal its “good intentions,” where
they exist.  Parties’ intentions can be key in negotiations and dispute resolution, with the
“settlement range” potentially affected: if dispositions are important in the utility function,16
mutually positive dispositions will increase the settlement range; negative ones will shrink it.19
The procedural justice literature gives evidence that the process (and, by inference,  intentions)
can be as important as the outcome in the resolution of a dispute.20
In summary, this paper has reported the results of an experiment designed to explore the
importance of causal attribution for the effort levels chosen by employees in a simulated labor
market.  While effort/wage slopes are always positive, indicating the importance of distributive
concerns, reciprocal altruism is found to be a significant factor and accounts for perhaps 20-
35% of the positive slope observed.  People respond with more effort when they feel they are
being intentionally well-treated and less when they perceive poor treatment. The evidence
presented helps to foster a better understanding of individual choice behavior in environments
featuring a high degree of interpersonal interaction.
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APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
You are an employee
GENERAL INFORMATION FOR EMPLOYEES
You will be taking part in a study of the labor market.  This research is being funded by the Vice
Chancellor for Research at UC - Berkeley.  If you read these instructions carefully, you may
earn a significant sum of money.  During the experiment your income will be calculated in
Guilders.  At the end of the experiment, Guilders will be converted into dollars at the rate of:
25 Guilders = $1
You will also receive a $5 payment for showing up for the experiment on time.  At the end of
the experiment your income will be paid to you in cash.
Stage 1: Each of the participants will be randomly assigned to one of two groups: half will be
"employees" and half will be "employers".  This is known by each participant.  Whether you are
an employer or an employee is noted at the top right hand corner of this page.  [Employer-
generated wages: At the first stage employers offer employees wages. Randomly-generated
wages: At the first stage employees will be offered wages. These wage offers will be randomly
determined by draws from a bingo cage.   Third-party generated wages: At the first stage
employees will be offered wages.  These wage offers are determined by a neutral third-party.]19
Employees must accept a wage offer, which must be at least 20 Coupons.  After 3 minutes the
second stage begins.
Stage 2: At the second stage, each employee makes a decision.  According to the procedure
described below, they determine how much they work (quantity or amount of work).
Attached to these instructions you will find decision-sheets on which you must record the wage.
Furthermore, you will record the amount of work which you have chosen.  After this you will
calculate the income you have earned.  At this point the first period of the labor market will be
over.  Overall, there will be ten periods in this experiment.  You will generally be matched
exactly once with each person in the employer group.  You will never be matched with the same
person in successive periods.  Further, you will not know with whom you have been matched in
any of the periods.  Your total income for the participation in this market will be the sum of the
earnings in each of the ten periods.20
How the Labor Market Works
1. At the beginning of each period we will open the labor market.  In the first stage of the labor
market each employer may offer a wage to an employee.  This employee must accept this wage
offer, forming a labor contract with the employer.
2. You must immediately record the wage on the decision sheet for that period.
3. You will have travel costs of 20 Guilders, which are subtracted from your wage..
4. No employer will know with which employee s/he has concluded a contract, and no
employer will know the employee.
5. After all wage offers are collected, the second stage begins.  After seeing a wage offer, you
must now choose a quantity of work.  We will then relay your chosen quantity of work to your
employer.  Please do not tell anyone what quantity of work you chose.  No other employee and
no other employer will be informed about your chosen quantity of work.21
How do you Calculate Your Income in Each Period?
1. You will receive the wage you have accepted.  From this wage you must then subtract the
travel costs and the costs of your amount of work.
2. You determine your quantity of work by choosing a number between 0.1 and 1.0 from the
schedule below.  The lowest amount of work you can choose  is 0.1, 0.2 is a slightly higher
amount, and so on up to 1.0, the highest amount.
3. The higher the quantity of work you choose, the better it is for your employer.  The higher
the number you choose, that is, the quantity of work, the higher "your" employer's income.
4. The higher the amount of work you choose the higher your work related costs will be.  You
can find out how these costs are related to quantity of work by looking in the schedule below.
5. Your income in Guilders will be determined by the following formula:
Income(4) = Wage(1) - Costs of Quantity of Work(2) - Travel Costs(3)
Schedule of feasible amounts of work (AW) and corresponding
work related costs to employees (COST)
AW                  0.1       0.2       0.3       0.4       0.5       0.6       0.7       0.8       0.9       1.0
COST   0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  1822
How do you Calculate the Income of Your Employer in Each Period?
1. Each employer receives from the experimenter 120 coupons which he may use to pay for
wages.  If s/he offers you a wage of 120 Guilders, then s/he will have no income coupons left.
If s/he offers you a wage of 20 Guilders then s/he will have 100 income coupons left.  In
general, your employer will have
120 coupons - wage
income coupons left.
2. How are the remaining coupons converted into Guilders?  The number of coupons retained
by the employer, whose wage offer you accepted, is multiplied by the quantity of work you
choose.  This result is the income of your employer in Guilders.  Thus:
Employer's Income in Guilders = Coupons Retained x Quantity of Work
Please Note: The income of all employees and employers will be computed according to
the same rules.  Every employer has 120 Coupons and the work related cost-schedule as
well as the travel costs are the same for every employee. Every employer is able to
compute the income of "his" or "her" employee, and every employee is able to compute
the income of "his" or "her" employer.23
Let's Have an Exercise
1. Let's assume that an employer, who has 120 Coupons, offers a wage of 110 Guilders, which
you accept.  At the second stage of this period you choose a quantity of work of 0.5.
What will your income and the income of your employer be?
My Income =   ............ Guilders
Employer's Income =   ............ Guilders
2. Let's assume that an employer, who has 120 Coupons, offers a wage of 28 Guilders, which
you accept.  At the second stage of this period you choose a quantity of work of 0.6.
What will your income and the income of your employer be?
My Income =   ............ Guilders
Employer's Income =   ............ Guilders
3. Now let's assume again that an employer, who has 120 Coupons, offers a wage of 28
Guilders, which you accept.  However, suppose that at the second stage of this period you now
choose a quantity of work of 0.1.
What will your income and the income of your employer be?
My Income =   ............ Guilders
Employer's Income =   ............ Guilders
Schedule of feasible amounts of work (AW) and corresponding
work related costs to employees (COST)
AW                  0.1       0.2       0.3       0.4       0.5       0.6       0.7       0.8       0.9       1.0




Amount of Work Chosen ............
Cost of Amount of Work Chosen (2) ............
Travel Costs (3) 20 Guilders
Your Income in Guilders (4) ............ Guilders
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Employer's Income in Guilders = (120 Coupons - Wage) x Amount of Work Chosen
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Employees will choose one of the feasible amounts of work (AW) from the first row.  The
higher the number, the higher the amount of work.
The second row of the schedule shows the cost of each amount of work (COST) for the
employee.  The higher the amount of work, the higher the costs to the employee.
Schedule of feasible amounts of work (AW) and corresponding
work related costs to employees (COST)
AW                  0.1       0.2       0.3       0.4       0.5       0.6       0.7       0.8       0.9       1.0
COST  0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  1825
You are an employer
GENERAL INFORMATION FOR EMPLOYERS
You will be taking part in the study of the labor market.  This research is being funded by the
Vice Chancellor for Research at UC - Berkeley.  If you read these instructions carefully, you
may earn a significant sum of money.  During the experiment your income will be calculated in
Guilders.  At the end of the experiment, Guilders will be converted into dollars at the rate of:
25 Guilders = $1
You will also receive a $5 payment for showing up for the experiment on time.  At the end of
the experiment your income will be paid to you in cash.
Stage 1: Each of the participants will be randomly assigned to one of two groups: half will be
"employees" and half will be "employers".  This is known by each participant.  Whether you are
an employer or an employee is noted at the top right hand corner of this page.  [Employer-
generated wages: At the first stage employers offer employees wages. Randomly-generated
wages: At the first stage employees will be offered wages. These wage offers will be randomly
determined by draws from a bingo cage.   Third-party generated wages: At the first stage
employees will be offered wages.  These wage offers are determined by a neutral third-party.]
Employees must accept a wage offer, which must be at least 20 Coupons.  After 3 minutes the
second stage begins.
Stage 2: At the second stage, each employee makes a decision.  According to the procedure
described below, they determine how much they work (quantity or amount of work).
Attached to these instructions you will find decision-sheets on which you must record the wage
you have offered.  Furthermore, you will record the amount of work that the employee has
chosen.  After this you will calculate the income you have earned.  At this point the first period
of the labor market will be over.  Overall, there will be ten periods in this experiment.  You will
generally be matched exactly once with each person in the employer group.  You will never be
matched with the same person in successive periods.  Further, you will not know with whom
you have been matched in any of the periods.  Your total income for the participation in this
market will be the sum of the earnings in each of the ten periods.26
How the Labor Market Works
1. At the beginning of each period we will open the labor market.  In the first stage of the labor
market each employer may offer a wage to an employee.  This employee must accept this wage
offer, forming a labor contract.  Wage offers must be no less than 20 Guilders and no more
than 120 Guilders.
2. You must immediately record this wage on the decision sheet for that period.
3. Each employee has to bear travel costs of 20 Guilders.
4. No employer will know with which employee s/he has concluded a contract, and no
employer will know the employee.
5. After all wage offers are collected, the second stage begins.  Now  employees must choose a
quantity of work.  We will then relay "your" employee's chosen quantity of work to you.  Please
do not tell anyone what quantity of work s/he chose.  No other employee and no other employer
will be informed about the quantity of work "your" employee has chosen.
.27
How do you Calculate Your Employee's Income in Each Period?
1. An employee will receive the wage s/he has accepted.  From this wage s/he must, however,
subtract the travel costs of 20 Guilders and the costs of the quantity of work s/he has chosen.
3. Employees determine their quantity of work by choosing a number between 0.1 and 1.0 from
the schedule below.  The lowest amount of work you can choose  is 0.1, 0.2 is a slightly higher
amount, and so on up to 1.0, the highest amount.
3. The higher the quantity of work s/he chooses, the better it is for you.  The higher the number
s/he chooses, that is, the quantity of work, the higher your income.
4. The higher the amount of work s/he chooses, the higher the work related costs will be.  You
can find out an employee's work related costs by looking in the schedule below.
5. An employee's income in Guilders will be determined by the following formula:
Income(4) = Wage(1) - Costs of Quantity of Work(2) - Travel Costs(3)
Schedule of feasible amounts of work (AW) and corresponding
work related costs to employees (COST)
AW                  0.1       0.2       0.3       0.4       0.5       0.6       0.7       0.8       0.9       1.0
COST   0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  1828
How do you Calculate Your Income in Each Period?
1. You will receive from the experimenter 120 coupons which you may use to pay wages.  If
you offer a wage of 120 Guilders, then you will have no income coupons left.  If you offer a
wage of 20 Guilders then you will have 100 income coupons left.  In general, you will have
120 coupons - wage
income coupons left.
2. How are the remaining coupons converted into Guilders?  The number of coupons retained
by you is multiplied by the quantity of work your employee has chosen.  This result is  your
income in Guilders.  Thus:
Your Income in Guilders(4) = {# of Coupons(1) - Wage(2)} x Quantity of Work(3)
Please Note: The income of all employees and employers will be computed according to
the same rules.  Every employer has 120 Coupons and the work related cost-schedule as
well as the travel costs are the same for every employee. Every employer is able to
compute the income of "his" or "her" employee, and every employee is able to compute
the income of "his" or "her" employer.29
Let's Have an Exercise
1. Let's assume that you used your 120 Coupons to offer a wage of 110 Guilders, which is
accepted.  At the second stage of this period this employee chooses a quantity of work of 0.5.
What will your income and the income of your employee be?
My Income =   ............ Guilders
Employee's Income =   ............ Guilders
2. Let's assume that you used your 120 Coupons to offer a wage of 28 Guilders, which is
accepted.  At the second stage of this period this employee chooses a quantity of work of 0.6.
What will your income and the income of your employee be?
My Income =   ............ Guilders
Employee's Income =   ............ Guilders
3. Now let's assume again that you used your 120 Coupons to offer a wage of 28 Guilders,
which is accepted.  However, suppose that at the second stage of this period this employee now
chooses a quantity of work of 0.1.
What will your income and the income of your employer be?
My Income =   ............ Guilders
Employer's Income =   ............ Guilders
Schedule of feasible amounts of work (AW) and corresponding
work related costs to employees (COST)
AW                  0.1       0.2       0.3       0.4       0.5       0.6       0.7       0.8       0.9       1.0
COST 0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  1830
Employer Number:
Period Number:
# of Coupons (1) 120
Wage (2) ............
Amount of Work Chosen by ............
Your Income in Guilders (4) ............ Guilders
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Travel Costs = 20 Guilders
Employee's Income in Guilders = Wage - Costs of Amount of Work Chosen - Travel
Costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Employees will choose one of the feasible amounts of work (AW) from the first row.  The
higher the number, the higher the amount of work.
The second row of the schedule shows the cost of each amount of work (COST) for the
employee.  The higher the amount of work, the higher the costs to the employee.
Schedule of feasible amounts of work (AW) and corresponding
work related costs to employees (COST)
AW                  0.1       0.2       0.3       0.4       0.5       0.6       0.7       0.8       0.9       1.0
COST 0  1  2  4  6  8  10  12  15  1831
APPENDIX B- Wage/effort pairs
Employer-generated wages
Effort








40 7 13 4 1 1
45 3
50 7 1 7 4 1
55 2 3
60 9 3 2 10 6 5
61 1
65 1 1 1 1 1
70 6 2 1 5 5 6 2 2
75 3 1 2 1 1
79 1 1
80 5 1 2 2 1 2
85 3
90 3 2 1
92 1
94 1









Wage .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1.0
20 17 3 2
25 2 1 1 1
30 2
35 2 2
40 9 1 3 2
45 5 2 1
50 4 1 2 3 1 232
55 1 1 1
60 10 4 7 10 5 1 1 3
65 1 2 1
70 8 4 1 2 7 4 1 1
75 4 3 1 2 3 2
80 4 1 4 3 1 1 4 1 1
85 2 1 1
90 2 1 2 1
Third-party-generated wages
Effort




35 7 1 1
40 9 3 4 1
45 1 2 3 2
50 3 4 5 2
55 2 1
60 13 2 4 7 14 2 1
65 2 1 1
70 10 2 2 5 10 2 2
75 2 2 2 1 1 2 3
80 10 1 2 2 7 1
85 1 1 1 1 1
90 1 1 2 1
Results by wage bracket
Wage range      Average effort
                  Employer      Random    Third party
           N      N       N
20-29 .1000  41 .1778   27 .1300    20
30-39 .1333   9 .1333    6 .1833    12
40-49 .2241  25 .2348   23 .2120    25
50-59 .2880  29 .4062   16 .3235    17
60-69 .3561  41 .3711   45 .3489    47
70-79 .4718  39 .3954   43 .3848    46
80-89 .4000  16 .4708   24 .4393    28
90+ .5200  20 .5500    6 .4800     5
Total .3127 220 .3463  190 .3220   20033
Wage range      Average effort
                  Employer      Random    Third party
           N      N       N
20-39 .1060  50 .1697   33 .1500    32
40-59 .2537  54 .3051   39 .2571    42
60-79 .4125  80 .3829   88 .3667    93
80+ .4667  36 .4867   30 .4455    33
Total .3127 220 .3463  190 .3220   200
APPENDIX C -PERIOD EFFECTS
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If reputation were important in effort determination, we should expect effort, or the (effort -










     Non-
Intentional
Avg. Effort





1 51.2 .2909 .00612 58.1 .3513 .00660
2 52.0 .2682 .00526 57.6 .3333 .00621
3 54.6 .3409 .00697 57.3 .3180 .00584
4 55.8 .3227 .00623 56.8 .3513 .00683
5 52.8 .2864 .00569 57.7 .3231 .00592
6 57.2 .3409 .00647 55.9 .3000 .00557
7 57.7 .3273 .00603 56.7 .3154 .00587
8 56.6 .3046 .00559 53.3 .3359 .00708
9 58.4 .3227 .00580 56.7 .3026 .00552
10 52.4 .2864 .00575 64.4 .3744 .0061835
APPENDIX D -LEARNING EFFECTS
Period
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Avg. wage 51.2 52.0 54.6 55.8 52.8 57.2 57.7 56.6 58.4 52.4









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
The wages do appear to be generally increasing over time and thus approaching the optimal
wage.  A regression of average wage against period gives a t-statistic for the period coefficient
of 0.86, n.s.
An informal survey was conducted with 5 employers in a bingo cage session.  In the last period,
they were asked to state what wage they would choose if they could.  These subjects specified
wage levels of 60, 60, 60, 65, and 75.